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Senin, 22 Juli 2013

Transaksi Sepi, IHSG Kehilangan 45 Poin

Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan (IHSG) pada penutupan awal pekan ini, Senin (22/7/2013) ditutup melemah 0,96 poin di posisi 4.678,98. Sepinya transaksi menjadi salah satu penyebab indeks melemah, meskipun di regional sebagian besar bursa ditutup menguat pada hari ini.

Dari 10 indeks sektoral, hanya dua yang menguat, yaitu agribisnis (0,94 persen) dan pertambangan (0,15 persen). Sementara itu, dua indeks ditutup tak berubah dari pembukaan hari ini, yaitu aneka industri dan infrastruktur, sedangkan sisanya turun dengan pelemahan terbesar dicatatkan oleh sektor konsumer (-1,52 persen).

Terdapat 93 saham yang naik, 147 yang turun dan 108 tak berubah. Adapun nilai transaksi pada hari ini hanya sebesar Rp 3,84 triliun, untuk 3,18 miliar saham. 

Pada awal perdagangan, indeks sempat bertahan di zona hijau. Namun sekitar 1 jam kemudian, IHSG meluncur ke zona merah. Pelemahan semakin dalam ketika investor melepaskan saham pada menit-menit terkahir perdagangan.

Saham-saham yang menjadi top losers hari ini adalah UNVR (-3,90 persen), UNTR (-4,97 persen), PSAB (-16,66 persen), INTP (-1,80 persen), AMFG (-4,24 persen), dan AALI (-1,71 persen).

Sementara itu, saham yang menjadi top gainers adalah MYOR (1,51 persen), LPPF (3,65 persen), TGKA (9 persen), SMAR (2,38 persen), EMTK (3,44 persen), dan EXCL (3,27 persen).

Dari regional, sebagian besar bursa dikawasan Asia Pasifik ditutup menguat. Berikut adalah bursa di kawasan regional :

Shanghai Composite -- 2.004,76 (0,61 persen)
Hang Seng Hong Kong --21.416,50 (0,25 persen)
KLSE Malaysia -- 1.797,68 0,06 (0.00 persen)
Nikkei Jepang --14.658,04 (0,47 persen)
NZ50, New Zealand -- 4.554,04 (0,35 persen)
Strait Times Singapura -- 3.234,35 (0,66 persen)
KOSPI Korea -- 1.880,35 (0,48 persen)
Taiwan Weighted -- 8.105,45 (0,54 persen)


21.40 Diposting oleh sourceSite 0

How and Why to Be a Leader (Not a Wannabe)

by Umair Haque
We need a new generation of leaders. And we need it now.
We're in the midst of a Great Dereliction — a historic failure of leadership, precisely when we need it most. Hence it's difficult, looking around, to even remember what leadership is. We're surrounded by people who are expert at winning — elections, deals, titles, bonuses, bailouts, profit. And often, we're told: they're the ones we should look up to — because it's the spoils and loot that really matter.
But you know and I know: mere winners are not true leaders — not just because gaming broken systems is nothing but an empty charade of living; but because life is not a game. It isn't about what you have, and how much — but what you do, and why — if you're to live a life that matters.
Leadership — true leadership —is a lost art. Leaders lead us not to a place — but to a different kind of destination: to our better, truer selves. It is an act of love in the face of an uncertain world.
Perhaps, then, that's why there's so little leadership around: because we're afraid to even say the word love — let alone to feel it, weigh it, measure it, allow it, admit it, believe it, and so be transformed by it.
Wannabes — who I'll contrast leaders with in this essay — are literally just that: wannabes. They want to be who leaders are, but cannot: they want the benefits of leadership, without the price; they want the respect, dignity, and title of leadership, without leading people to lives that matter; they want the love leaders earn, act by painful act, without, in return, having the courage, humility, and wisdom to love.
When you think about chiefs, presidents, and prime ministers that way, I'd suggest that most of our so-called leaders are wannabes: those who want to be seen as leaders, without leading us anywhere but into stagnation, decline, fracture, fear, apathy, and comfortable, cheap pleasures that numb us to it all. Leaders — true leaders, those worthy of the word — do the very opposite: they lead us to truth, worth, nobility, wonder, imagination, joy, heartbreak, challenge, rebellion, meaning. Through love, they lead us to lives that matter. Wannabes impoverish us. Leaders enrich us.
So here are my six ways to start being a (real) leader — and stop being just another wannabe.
Obey — or revolt? Are you responding to incentives — or reshaping them? Here's the simplest difference between leaders and wannabes. Wannabes respond dully, predictably, neatly, to "incentives," like good little rational robots. They do it for the money and end up stifled by the very lives they choose. Leaders play a very different role. They don't just dully, robotically "respond" to "incentives" — their job is a tiny bit of revolution. And so they must reshape incentives, instead of merely responding to them. They have principles they hold dearer than next year's bonus — and so they think bigger and truer than merely about what they're "incentivized" to do. If you're easily bought off from what you really hold dear with a slightly bigger bonus, here's the plain fact: you're not a true leader.
Conform — or rebel? Are you breaking the rules or following them? The rules are there for a reason: to stifle deviation, preserve the status quo, and bring the outliers right back down to the average. That's a wonderful idea if you're running a factory churning out widgets — but it's a terrible notion if you're trying to do anything else. And so leaders must shatter the status quo by breaking the rules, leading by example,= so that followers know the rules not just can, but must be broken. If you're nail-bitingly following the rules, here's the score: you're not a true leader.
Value — or values? Why do people follow true leaders? Because leaders promise to take them on worthwhile journeys. The wannabe creates "value" for shareholders, for clients, for "consumers". But the leader creates what's more true, more enduring, more resonant: lives of real human worth. And they must do so by evoking in people values that matter, not merely "value" which is worthless. Which would you choose? In a heartbeat, most people choose the latter, because value without values is what reality TV is to a great book: empty, vacant, narrow, arid. If you're creating value — without setting values — you're not a leader: you're just a wannabe.
Vision — or truth? The wannabe sets a vision. With grandiloquent gesture and magnificent panorama, the vision glitters. The leader has a harder task: to tell the truth, as plain as day, as obvious as dawn, as sure as sunrise, as inescapable as midnight. Vision is nice, and many think that a Grand Vision is what inspires people. They're wrong. If you really want to inspire people, tell them the truth: there's nothing that sets people free like the truth. The leader tells the truth because his fundamental task is that of elevation: to bring forth in people their better selves. And while we can climb towards a Grand Vision, it's also true that the very act of perpetually climbing may be what imprisons us in lives we don't really want (hi, Madison Ave, Wall St, and Silicon Valley). Truth is what elevates us; what opens us up to possibility; what produces in us the sense that we must become who were meant to be if we are to live worthy lives — and one of the surest tests of whether you're a true leader is whether you're merely (yawn, shrug, eyeroll) slickly selling a Grand Vision, or, instead, helping bring people a little closer to the truth. And if you have to ask what "truth" is (newsflash: climate change is real, the global economy is still borked, greed isn't good, bankers shouldn't earn a billion times what teachers do, CEOs shouldn't get private jets for life for running companies into the ground, the sky really is blue) — guess what? You're definitely not a leader.
Archery — or architecture? Wannabes are something like metric-maximizing robots. Given a set of numbers they must "hit," they beaver away trying to hit them. The leader knows their job is very different: not merely to maximize existing metrics, which are often part of the problem (hi, GDP, shareholder value), but to reimagine them. The leader's job is, fundamentally, not merely to "hit a target" — but to redesign the playing field. It's architecture, not mere archery. If you're hitting a target, you're not a leader. You're just another performer, in an increasingly meaningless game.
love — or Love. Many of us, it's true, choose jobs we "love" over those we don't, readily sacrificing a few bucks here and there in the process. But this isn't love as much as it is enjoyment. Love — true love, the real thing, big-L Love — is every bit as much painful as it is pleasant. It transforms us. And that is the surest hallmark of a true leader. They have a thirst not merely for love — but to love; a thirst that cannot be slaked merely through accomplishments, prizes, or honors. It can only, only be slaked through transformation; and that is why true leaders must, despite the price, through the pain, into the heart of very heartbreak itself, lead.
And yet.
We're afraid, you and I, of this word: love. Afraid of love because love is the most dangerously explosive substance the world has ever known, will ever know, and can ever know. Love is what frees the enslaved and enslaves the free. Because love, finally, is all: all we have, when we face our final moments, and come to know that life, at last, must have been greater than us if we are to feel as if it has mattered.
The old men say: children, you must never, ever believe in love. Love is heresy. Believe in our machines. Believe in operation and calculation. Place your faith in being their instruments. Our perfect machines will bring you perfection.
I believe lives as cold as steel will only yield a world as cruel as ice. I believe cool rationality and perfect calculation can take us only a tiny distance towards the heart of what is good, true, and timelessly noble about life. Because there is no calculus of love. There is no equation for greatness. There is no algorithm for imagination, virtue, and purpose.
Even a perfect machine is just a machine.
If we are to lead one another, we will need the heresy of love. We must shout at yesterday in the language of love if we are to lead one another. Not just to tomorrow, but to a worthier destination: that which we find in one another.
It's often said that leaders "inspire". But that's only half the story. Leaders inspire us because they bring out the best in us. They evoke in us our fuller, better, truer, nobler selves. And that is why we love them — not merely because they paint portraits of a better lives, but because they impel us to be the creators of our own.
21.33 Diposting oleh sourceSite 0

To Change the World, Invest in One Woman

by Carly Fiorina
A fact I might have suspected before hit me with full force when I participated in the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ effort to outline “a vision for global prosperity.” After reviewing extensive research, a group of us made recommendations on how the United States could improve the outcomes of its development efforts and bring greater prosperity and stability to the world. We all agreed on one of them: Invest more in female entrepreneurs.
I’m talking about women like Alice Cyanzayire, who runs a small but thriving agribusiness in Rwanda; Christina Guatemala, who started a tiny general store known as a pulpería in Nicaragua; and Ana Serrano, who survived as a street child in the Philippines on scraps from the local dump but now owns a store.
Supporting enterprises like theirs is a huge opportunity, because, as the World Economic Forum has consistently found, the correlation between gender equality and national competitiveness is strong. The WEF annually measures the degree to which women experience less economic participation, remuneration, and advancement than men in various countries of the world. Even in the most developed economies, gross domestic product could be increased by as much as 16% if the gender gap were closed.
Why more has not been done to close this gap is a mystery to me. And here’s another puzzle: Where is the outrage? Of the estimated 2.5 billion people worldwide who live on less than $2 a day, 70% are women. How is it tolerated that the weight of poverty, trauma, and subjugation still falls hardest on them?
People often avoid looking squarely at a problem that is so immense that the appropriate action isn’t obvious. It is tempting to simply leave global issues to the aid community. But if you reviewed the numbers, or met some of the women behind them, you would be outraged—and you’d take the first chance you saw to make a difference.
To me, the imperative to take action is clear. The businesspeople I know have the scale and resources to support women entrepreneurs, and many of their companies have a good business case for doing so. For example, when Coca-Cola invests in training thousands of women entrepreneurs in Africa, it directly benefits from a stronger base of distributors and marketers. While I was the CEO of HP, we made corporate commitments using similar logic.
Meanwhile, as individual citizens, none of us should shrink from what we are capable of. In 2008, while working as an adviser to the State Department, I entered into a public-private partnership with USAID and helped found the One Woman Initiative. Condoleezza Rice, then the secretary of state, worked with us to support grassroots organizations that focused on women’s need for leadership training, job opportunities, and justice. The three women I mentioned above all benefited from an organization that OWI partners with today: Opportunity International, which works within the public-policy frameworks of some 20 countries to provide loans, training, technical expertise, and insurance.
Those three strong, successful women are a reminder that even with government, business, and philanthropy all contributing, progress often boils down to the initiative of one woman. With a small starter loan—just $136 for Alice, $330 for Christina, and $94 for Ana—she can invest in a fledgling business, go on to repay her loan, and lift herself, her family, and a part of her community out of poverty. The single greatest point of untapped leverage in the world today is a woman who could be an entrepreneur. So get outraged—and then get down to the work of supporting and partnering with her.
21.22 Diposting oleh sourceSite 0

Jumat, 07 Juni 2013

Defense Economics

by: Gavin Kennedy

Defense economics, field of national economic management concerned with the economic effects of military expenditure, the management of economics in wartime, and the management of peacetime military budgets.

Opportunities foregone: the cost of war
There is no such thing as an inexpensive war. First, there is the human cost in loss of life and in the physical and psychological maiming of healthy people. While the personal cost of such loss is immeasurable, theeconomic cost to society can be estimated. This measure was first proposed by a French economist, Jean-Baptiste Say, in 1803. He asserted the principle that war costs more than its direct expenses, for it also costs what its casualties (military and civilian) would have earned throughout their lifetimes if they had never participated in war.

Second, war has economic costs arising from the destruction of buildings, productive farmlands and forests, public services such as waterworks, electricity-generating and distribution systems, roads, bridges, harbours, and airfields, and all manner of personal and corporate property such as homes, possessions, factories, machinery, vehicles, and aircraft. War, therefore, destroys physical capital that has been created by previous economic activity.

Reconstruction after war is a particular economic burden because the finance, imported capital goods, and labour used in reconstruction merely restore the losses a country has sustained, rather than adding to the stock of capital available to its economy. Thus, even if it manages to restore all its physical losses, it uses scarce resources that would otherwise have been available for extending and improving economic activity. As most wars since 1945 have occurred in the Third World, some of the world’s poorest countries have suffered the most from the economic losses of war.

War also costs a great deal in goods and services to create the weapons of war and to supply the people engaged in the war effort. The diversion of these goods and services—which range from the metals and chemicals transformed into weapons to the food, clothing, and shelter for the armed forces—reduces current civilian consumption, which lowers the population’s living standards. Metal used to make a tank cannot be used to build bridges, fuel used to transport military supplies cannot be used on school buses, cement used to construct ammunition dumps cannot be used in house construction. This constitutes the opportunity cost of war—that is, the extent to which the economy foregoes the opportunity to commit these resources to alternative peaceful uses.

The opportunity cost of war is also felt in the future. In addition to allocating resources to consumption (the satisfaction of current needs), an economy allocates resources to investment (the new factories and machinery that produce tomorrow’s goods and services). Resources diverted to war cannot be used to create new productive capacity for future consumption, and this reduces the living standards of the population below what they otherwise would have been in the future.

In summary, the total costs of war include the cost of the foregone use of the economic resources used up in the conflict. These include the cost of the foregone lifetime earnings of those killed in the war, the cost of lifetime medical care for those permanently incapacitated by the war, the cost of replacing the physical capital destroyed or damaged by the war, the cost of supplying the armed forces with the weapons of war, the cost of sustaining the armed forces and those in support functions (including their pay and pensions), and the losses to the economy caused by the diversion of resources from peaceful investment in future economic capacity.
Defense expenditure: the cost of deterrence

As war is expensive, countries aim to avoid its costs and remain independent within sovereign borders. In the absence of a universally binding and verifiable agreement to abolish war, the best option is to deter those countries prone, by their history or by the policies of their governments, to resolve disputes by resorting to war. Deterrence has two aspects. First, by allocating resources for a minimum level of military capability, a nation ensures that it can resist an attack by a potential aggressor and severely damage the aggressor’s economy and territory. In this way the costs to the aggressor of initiating a war will far exceed any likely gains. Second, by making credible its willingness to use military force, should it prove necessary to do so, the nation aims to leave potential aggressors in no doubt of the consequences they will suffer if they are tempted to launch an attack.

Deterrence, while expensive, is incomparably less expensive than war. The study of its expense constitutes the subject matter of defense economics.
Measuring the burden

Adam Smith, the founder of economics as a discipline in the social sciences, was the first economist to theorize about the economics of war. In his major work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith considered a perennial problem of defense management, namely, the increasing expense of war-fighting equipment. He noted that changing technology raised the costs of war—for example, that the musket was a more expensive item to acquire than its predecessor, the javelin. (In the same way, a modern jet fighter is much more expensive than its propeller-driven predecessor.)

The rising cost of weapon technology does not mean that defense costs (d) necessarily rise as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP; the sum of all expenditures made in one year). The d/GDP ratio is a measure of the military burden, and evidence suggests that this burden has not risen through time (in high-income economies it has been falling for most of the post-World War II decades). Although the unit costs of specific weapons rise as technology adds to their capabilities, high-cost solutions to one form of a military threat (for example, the use of expensive tanks to defend against a massed tank attack) usually become vulnerable to low-cost alternatives (such as the relatively cheap antitank missile and precision-guided munitions), which either alter the nature of the threat or make redundant the high-cost solution.

In a developed economy, the annual costs of defense procurement and logistics typically take up more than half of the defense budget, the rest being spent on personnel. In the underdeveloped economies, the balance is reversed: most of the annual costs (70–90 percent) are spent on personnel, with the remainder spent on procurement and logistics. This difference reflects the gap in available war-fighting technology between the developed and the underdeveloped worlds. The bulk of the world’s defense spending is accounted for by the high-income economies (the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union), primarily because of the cost of high-technology weapon systems. Yet most wars are fought in low-income countries between relatively poorly equipped armed forces. Moreover, the inability of low-income countries to maintain sophisticated weapons to the operational standards of their manufacturers fully explains the many logistical problems the armed forces of poor countries have faced in their wars. Importing sophisticated weapon systems does not guarantee a sophisticated defense capability if the support system (fuel, spares, ammunition, repairs, and overhaul procedures) is either less than satisfactory or less than adequately funded. Defense capability is inseparably linked to the cost of maintenance.

Defense is a public good; that is, once deterrence is achieved, all citizens benefit from the avoidance of war and no citizen can be excluded from enjoying the benefits. People who could not be excluded from a public benefit would, if given the choice, rationally choose not to contribute toward its cost. In other words, they could “free ride” on the contributions of others. For this reason, defense in all countries is paid for by taxation, a burden that is borne by all citizens, and in all countries the military force considered necessary for deterrence is under the direct and exclusive control of the government.
Comparing burdens

SETTLING ON A STANDARD
International comparisons of how governments arrange their defense spending are fraught with conceptual discrepancies. The defense burden of a country is measured by the d/GDP ratio, which indicates how much of the nation’s resources are being allocated to defense each year, but different estimates of both d and GDP are possible, each giving a different d/GDP ratio. Capitalist economies, which use the GDP, measure economic activity differently from communist economies, which use a net material product (NMP) system. The NMP excludes many expenditures, including state administration and defense, normally included under GDP. This complicates comparisons between these systems.

Defense expenditures themselves are subject to controversy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has agreed on a measure of defense activity to which it adheres when making comparisons of its members’ defense burdens, but other countries follow different conventions. Some, largely low-income countries, exclude internal security expenditures, which can be relatively high, thus lowering their official d/GDP ratio. Others, such as the Soviet Union, exclude defense-related research and development, frontier guards, and paramilitary reserves, thereby reducing the nominal defense expenditure by up to 30 percent.

Even if agreement could be reached on what constitutes defense expenditure, this would still leave countries with a measure denominated in their domestic currencies. For meaningful comparisons of the absolute amounts spent on defense, every country’s defense expenditures would have to be reduced to a common currency. But the act of converting each currency into, for example, U.S. dollars could lead to distortions, because official exchange rates reflect official policies and not existing realities. Thus, two countries with similar amounts in dollars spent on defense, and therefore in balance in their defense capabilities, could face a growing imbalance in their dollar-based defense expenditures purely because one of their currencies has changed its exchange rate with the U.S. dollar.

Comparisons of the absolute amounts each country spends on defense are prone to error and must always be used with caution. Nevertheless, because each country measures its defense spending and its GDP in its own currency, the d/GDP ratio is an acceptable measure of a country’s defense burden. Ratios can be compared across countries and in different time periods. The d/GDP ratio rises rapidly during a major war—in Britain in 1944 the d/GDP ratio reached 60 percent—and it falls in periods of prolonged peace. A country raising its d/GDP ratio signals that it is concerned with security, in turn causing concern among countries likely to be affected.
 
DEFENSE BURDENS WORLDWIDE
Security expenditures for both external defense and internal law and order account for major shares of government expenditures. In many low-income countries, these expenditures often exceed 20–30 percent of the state budget and more than 10 percent of the country’s GDP. The higher-income countries, while spending higher absolute amounts on defense, tend to spend smaller proportions of state expenditure (under 15 percent) and smaller proportions of GDP (under 5 percent). Given the perilous security situation in the lower-income regions of the world, these discrepancies are understandable (if also regrettable in view of their other pressing needs).

By looking at the actual defense burden of an individual country and comparing it with the norm for similar economies, analysts can infer localized circumstances that may be influencing the government’s perceptions of security. For instance, a poor country with a very low d/GDP, or a rich country with a very high d/GDP, is behaving differently from the norm for similar economies. An economist would seek explanations for this in the perception of a threat indicated by the public statements of the government concerned. In the absence of such statements, or where public statements are contrary to the behaviour of the government (for example, if it is raising its d/GDP but publicly proclaiming its peaceful intentions and denying that it is threatened by, or is threatening, any other country), the economist would rely on the d/GDP as an indicator of true intentions. It is likely that the intelligence services of neighbouring countries would draw similar conclusions from the economic data.

Within the higher-income countries there are notable differences in the amounts spent on defense. The United States and Britain have spent relatively high proportions (5 to 10 percent) of their GDP on defense since 1955, compared with Japan, which has spent less than 1 percent of GDP over the same period. Germany and France also have tended to spend a smaller proportion of their GDPs than Britain on defense (though the absolute amounts have been similar, since they have larger GDPs than Britain).

The Japanese case is interesting because of the differences in economic achievement between Japan and the big defense spenders. Many economists believe that there is a connection between the amount of GDP spent on defense and a country’s economic growth, investment, and living standards. Japan’s limit of d/GDP to under 1 percent was a result of its defeat in World War II. There is no doubt that it benefited enormously from limited defense spending (particularly while it could free ride under the military protection of the United States), since resources not allocated to defense went into economic investment, to the direct benefit of civilian employment and output. However, at the same time Japan also spent much less (about half as much) of its GDP on general government expenditure (g) than the United States and western Europe. Whether it was the low d/GDP (1 percent) or the low g/GDP (9 percent) that allowed the resources for Japanese economic successes to be mobilized is arguable. A low g/GDP ratio implies a lower level of taxation than a high g/GDP. This releases a higher flow of savings into the economy, enabling higher investment ratios to be maintained. High rates of investment, which are associated with higher growth rates of GDP, characterized the Japanese post-war economy and are a more likely explanation for the Japanese economic success than its low d/GDP.

The Soviet Union has long spent a high proportion of its national resources on defense. Estimates vary, but the consensus among Western economists is that Soviet d/GDP for much of the postwar period was around 14 percent. (The official Soviet d/GDP was 6 percent.) If defense spending competes with economic growth in the capitalist economies, contributing to inflation, low investment, and lower living standards, then it must have a devastating impact on poorer economies such as the Soviet Union. The need to compete with the United States at all technological levels across the weapons spectrum has been met at the cost of heavy distortions in the rest of the Soviet economy. This has compelled the Soviet Union to review its priorities and to consider whether its security is best assured by continually raising the military ante with the West or by living at some lower level of military tension with a reduced offensive military capability.
Defense management: budgeting deterrence

“How much defense is enough defense?” is the great unanswerable question of defense economics. Those charged with preparing a defense capability tend to be more cautious about the level of capability than those who eventually have to pay for it. In fact, the very success of deterrence—a high probability of nonattack throughout a long period of peace—tends to reduce the amount of defense spending that the electorate considers necessary to achieve deterrence. Judging the appropriate level of military preparedness is not a science; it is a mixture of intelligent response to credible threats and of judicious, cautious preparation “just in case” this or that should arise. The managers of the armed forces tend to increase the contingencies they wish to prepare for, while skeptical taxpayers tend to question whether certain preparations are absolutely essential. In democracies this tension forms the permanent agenda of the defense debate.
Stocks and flows

Defense expenditures are made on an annual basis, the government allocating so much of its total budget to personnel costs, so much to the procurement of weapon systems, and so much to general support. The pay and allowances of defense personnel are consumed within the year; that is, they spend their wages, allowances, and pensions on consumer goods and, in so doing, add to total demand in the economy. Procurement, on the other hand, is somewhat different. A tank lasts much longer than the single year in which it is purchased. Because it is supposed to last as long as it takes to become obsolescent, the tank becomes part of the country’s permanent defense capability. That defense capability is, in economic terms, a stock, while the annual expenditure is called a flow.

Even if, for some reason, a defense budget is reduced in a single year, a country’s defense capability need not be reduced. The government can still draw on the stock paid for by previous defense budgets, which is manifested in its tanks, aircraft, ships, communications systems, trained personnel, and expertise in military affairs. Clearly, if the defense budget continues to be reduced every year, there will come a point at which the country’s defense capability will decline through attrition as items of equipment become obsolete or beyond repair.

The analogy is with a bath that is filling with water while the plughole is open. As water pours into the bath, water also drains from the plughole. It is the difference between the rates at which water flows in and out that determines whether the bath fills or empties. If the flows in and out are equal, the water level will remain constant. Likewise with defense capability: if the additions (flow in) to the stock of weapons matches the attrition (flow out) of the stock from all causes, then the country’s defense capability will remain constant.
Measuring a threat: the example of NATO

Budgeting a nation’s defense capability is complicated, however, because defense capability is not determined unilaterally; it depends on the capability of the potential aggressor. The gap in military capability between any two countries is known as the threat, and estimates of the threat constitute the major input into defense planning.

If a potential aggressor develops an advanced weapon system that effectively counters a weapon stocked by the defender, it will eventually threaten to overwhelm the latter’s defenses. Likewise, a growth in the stock of weapons deployed by a potential aggressor can eventually have a similar effect in threatening to overwhelm the defender’s smaller stocks. If the defending country does not invest in overcoming each new threat to its capability—by technology, new types of weapons, increasing the stock of current weapons, or all three options simultaneously—it will risk a reduction in the probability of nonattack—that is, its deterrence capability will be compromised.

THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Estimates of the threat of a Soviet invasion across the German border determined the nature of NATO’s response for more than 40 years. While NATO planners considered their own forces to be technologically superior to the Soviet forces, they were nevertheless mindful that the Soviet Union had a decisive quantitative superiority in conventional forces (more tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and troops). The threat of a land-based invasion by Soviet forces, which the planners considered to be virtually unstoppable, led directly to the decision to deploy nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against an invasion of western Europe.

Nobody could survive a major nuclear war in Europe. The damage to the Soviet Union from an American nuclear strike would be matched only by the damage to the United States from a Soviet nuclear strike. Because each country has maintained sufficient nuclear forces to respond in kind to a first strike by the other, a nuclear exchange would be suicidal for both. Whatever the rhetoric, therefore, both countries have a strong interest in preventing war of any kind from breaking out on the continent of Europe. Literally, they are hostage to each other’s behaviour, making Europe an unsafe place to start a war. This doctrine, known as “mutual assured destruction,” was given the appropriate acronym MAD.

The consequences of MAD led NATO to adopt a policy known as “flexible response.” Rather than an all-or-nothing nuclear exchange, this envisaged a staged escalation of NATO’s response to a Soviet invasion, based on containing the initial thrust of the Soviet forces and warning them of the consequences of further encroachment on NATO’s territory. To underline the credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation, NATO commanders were issued battlefield nuclear weapons, which NATO governments might or might not release for immediate use, with or without warning. Uncertainty about NATO’s policy of probable first use of nuclear weapons was regarded as sufficient to make Europe an unsafe place for the Soviet Union to risk the consequences of a conventional war. As long as the risk of the horrendous consequences of a nuclear war exceeded the prospects of potential gain from launching an attack, the probability of nonattack on western Europe by the Soviet Union remained at an acceptable level.

THE ECONOMICS OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
The possession of nuclear weapons by some NATO countries (the United States, Britain, and France) did not obviate the need for expenditure on conventional armed forces. To abandon conventional forces would risk having to use nuclear weapons as soon as the first Soviet forces crossed the German border or some naval incident occurred in any part of the world. This escalation from a small incident to the end of the world in one short step was unacceptable; hence, NATO countries invested resources in conventional capabilities in addition to nuclear weapons. These conventional forces aim to blunt a Soviet attack and give time for political processes to influence the Soviet government’s decisions.

Matching conventional forces to Soviet conventional capabilities had to take note of two facts: First, the Soviet Union had overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. Military doctrine holds that concentrating superior force at a single point can overwhelm the defense, and the Soviet Union had the capability to achieve such a strategic advantage at a time and place of its choosing. Second, while NATO had advantages in military technology, there was a constant effort by the Soviet Union to close the technological gap. Also, there is some point at which a quantitative advantage acquires a qualitative dimension, and this advantage cannot be neutralized solely by relying on a technological gap between the weapon systems themselves.

Thus the paradox of NATO defense spending. The alliance was constantly trying to widen the technological gap to compensate for its disadvantage in numbers, while at the same time it was required to maintain large quantities of its existing systems to redress the ever-widening gap in numbers that the Soviet Union was believed to be creating across the German border. Whether to develop ever-new weapon systems to combat a closing of the technological gap by the Soviet Union as well as the sheer numbers of Soviet systems, or to concentrate on supplying the armed forces with duplicate copies of existing designs, has long been NATO’s quandary.
Choosing weapon systems

Since the 1960s there have been several attempts to impose some rationality upon defense planning. The complexity of weapons development has few parallels in civilian development. Working close to technologicalfrontiers (sometimes having to think beyond them) under management systems imbued with a public-sector rather than a commercial ethos, under government budgetary constraints and shifting political priorities, and subject to ever-changing estimates of the threat the system is designed to counter, has produced an expensive and time-consuming procurement system. Lead times of 18 to 25 years from initial concept to in-service production are not unknown in defense procurement.

The need for more rational choices in weapon programs and in the deployment of scarce resources increased as the defense budgets grew in absolute size (though falling as a proportion of a growing GDP). The cost of errors in choice increases as the cost of a single weapon platform escalates, so that, with a new weapon system costing $10–40 billion, it is crucial not to find that it is not needed by the time it is in service, that the technology cannot be made to work, or that it has been made obsolete by new developments.

The Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile program, begun by the United States in 1956, was the first highly complex system that required new management techniques to be brought to successful completion. One technique—called program evaluation and review technique (PERT)—found civilian applications after it was invented by the U.S. Navy to build Polaris on time and under budget. Similarly, earlier techniques such as cost–benefit analysis (invented to cope with submarine hunting problems during World War II) and input–output analysis (a technique developed by the U.S. Air Force for identifying the critical parts of an economy to develop or damage) rapidly spread into civilian use and into most academic management programs.

The first attempts to bring rational choice to the management of a defense budget coincided with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Terms such as systems analysis, as well as planning, programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS) and functional costing, became common in defense management. Much of the intellectual capital invested in these techniques came from economists, whose discipline in costing options and marginal analysis provided them (if not always the defense managers they advised) a set of tools appropriate to the task.

When decisions are made solely by the lobbying of special interests—such as the navy, air force, and army—the result is likely to be a constant compromise under which programs remain in the budget because of political considerations. Defense analysts attempt to force the military lobbyists to set specific objectives for their programs and to accept criteria by which the military value of the programs can be judged. Like many management fashions, PPBS and its associated techniques did not survive in their earliest forms, but they did establish the belief that analyzing, evaluating, and choosing rationally was superior to lobbying by bureaucrats and, sometimes, by corrupting commercial interests.

This can be illustrated by the technique of functional costing. Ordinarily, most budgets are a listing of expenditures under various main headings—personnel, equipment, and supplies—and the total is approved through the political process. This type of budget is called an accountability budget because it accounts for defense expenditure, but it cannot inform the defense planner (or the taxpayer) how efficiently the defense department has spent the budget. Under functional costing, the objectives of a proposed military program are shown along with the costs of all the resources needed to fulfill each objective, irrespective of which armed service contributes to the activity.

For example, under functional costing there is no navy budget that costs everything spent by the navy. There is instead a maritime defense budget, a deep-sea navy budget, a coastal defense budget, and so on. These budgets may include costed contributions from units of the navy, air force, and army, plus an assessment of the costs of support functions used to carry out the activities. If, for instance, it is proposed to add a longer-range aircraft to the maritime defense role, this can be costed, and, depending upon the importance of extending maritime defense compared to other objectives, an informed decision can be made on whether to allocate the incremental funds to the upgraded aircraft or to some other project supporting some other military activity. Deciding between marginal increases or decreases in expenditures across different functions, all of them linked to specified objectives, is an improvement over buying aircraft simply because it is the turn of the air force to get a big project approved by the government.
Conscript or volunteer

Modern armed forces use either a voluntary recruitment scheme or a form of conscription to supply the people needed to staff the military. Each scheme has economic consequences.

Conscription involves a period of compulsory military service for all eligible males, usually triggered by their date of birth. (In some countries, such as Israel, females are also required to undergo military service, though usually in a support rather than a combat role.) Conscription provides a pool of recruits at a low cost per head. The conscripts receive extremely low wages, well below what they would earn as civilians. This difference in earnings is a direct monetary loss to them and a loss to society, which loses the output they would produce if they remained civilians. Conscription offers a net saving only to the defense budget, although what is saved in personnel costs is largely spent in increased training costs. Conscript armies require much larger training programs than volunteer armies because the service life of a conscript (two or three years) is shorter than a volunteer’s term of engagement (three to 15 years). Each new age group of conscripts has to be trained, diverting full-time soldiers from other duties as well as adding to overall costs.


Volunteer armies cost more per head because their wages must be comparable in some degree to civilian wages. While a national emergency can induce people to volunteer, a peacetime recruit is influenced by the alternative incomes that can be earned as a civilian. Some people volunteer whatever the wages, and some volunteer because they are unemployed as civilians, but most evidence indicates that volunteer rates will fall if military wages fall too far below civilian wages. This is particularly true for volunteer officers, who take with them critical skills when they leave the armed forces for well-paid jobs as civilians.

While volunteer armies cost more per head, they can cost less in total because they do not have to be as large as conscript armies. Although conscription is common across the three branches of the armed services, the proportion of regular volunteers to conscripts is smaller in the army and larger by far in the navy and air force. Ships and aircraft require more-skilled and better-educated personnel than infantry divisions, and the navy and air force in most countries tend to use conscripts only in less-skilled roles, reserving the command roles (pilots, captains, engineers, navigators) for volunteers. This pattern can be seen in many Latin-American military forces. In Israel, where conscription covers practically the entire population, the problem of retaining skilled recruits is met by extending the periods of military service through the civilian lifetimes of the recruits.

All personnel policies are vulnerable to demography. The proportion of a nation’s population that is made up of young people eligible by fitness and intelligence for military service sets a limit on how many can be conscripted or induced to volunteer. Conscript armies, which are cost-effective when there is a large pool of young people from which to choose, are particularly threatened by demographic changes that reduce the pool of potential recruits. As the birth rate appears to fall in higher-income economies over time, the prospect for mass conscript armies looks bleak. Switching to an all-volunteer force is a short-term alternative, although the decline in the recruitable age group will force up military wages as the armed forces compete with civilian employers for the same age group. Substituting technology for labour is another short-term solution. But it too has limitations, not the least of them the problem of recruiting from a shrinking age group a sufficiently educated and skilled labour pool to operate sophisticated military equipment.
War finance: when deterrence fails

War is too serious, and too expensive, to be left to the whim of chance, yet throughout history many governments have been willing to engage in war if it suited their interests as they perceived them, and many have also been dragged into wars when cooler calculations might have encouraged them to remain at peace. It was out of the need to raise the finance to conduct wars that the earliest systems for collecting public finance developed.
Taxation

The practice of taxing the population to pay for war has a long history. In early nomadic societies, wars could be fought with little expense other than time and casualties. Nomadic horsemen engaged in war as an extension of their normal activities as herdsmen. If successful, the warriors plundered the defeated, who were either killed, sold, or scattered. With more-settled agricultural societies, wars could be fought between planting and harvest, the armies living off of the land or the pay of the king. In the feudal system each man had an obligation to fight if required by the lord of the manor, to whom the vassal owed his livelihood. Weapons were often the personal possessions of the warriors and were fashioned by themselves, their forebears, or craftsmen. As weapons improved in quality and ingenuity, special efforts to produce them had to be made—for which their producers were paid out of public funds, as were the soldiers to whom they were distributed. These expenses necessitated the collection of special funds, and thus the government turned to levies on the population to provide the resources.

Where taxation alone was not sufficient to pay for a war, the king could resort to selling relief from feudal obligations (usually to prosperous cities), and to borrowing from rich individuals (who risked confiscation if they refused and not being paid back if they agreed). Most political crises in European history up to the 19th century arose from disputes over public finance, usually to pay for wars. The English Civil Wars of 1642–51 were a typical example of a bitter dispute between king and parliament over which had the powers of taxation.

By the time of the French Revolution in 1789, warfare had ceased to be a localized affair with a few thousand soldiers engaged in a single decisive battle. Warfare had become a massive undertaking, often lasting months and years and involving armies of hundreds of thousands. The expense of war reached levels unheard of previously. The Royal Navy, for instance, employed 200,000 men in the 1790s alone. Out of the need to find new sources of revenue for the long war between Britain and France from 1793 to 1815, the British government introduced a temporary income tax to be levied on all persons earning above a high minimum income. The advantages of the system soon became evident, and income taxes were widely adopted as permanent sources of government revenue.
Borrowing

The British government also discovered another source of revenue, the national debt. Whereas previous borrowings by monarchs were a great risk to the lender, under the national debt scheme the government agreed to guarantee regular payment of interest to all persons who lent to it, either in perpetuity or for a fixed term. Holders of government bonds were also permitted to sell them, passing the right to the guaranteed income to the buyer. Again, the system was so successful that it was soon copied by other governments, not all of them as scrupulous in their repayments as they promised. War bonds featured strongly in the two world wars, and it was regarded as patriotic to use personal savings to purchase them—though most of the borrowing came from institutions.

The new sources of war finance enabled the increased expense of war to be met—and, in the opinion of some economists, made it more likely that a government would embark on a war for less than good reason. If war had to be financed out of the current consumption of the population, natural limits would be set on war being undertaken lightly, but borrowing removed these limits. Though the population would be saddled with interest payments for decades to come, this cost was small and of long duration compared to the immediate cut in living standards that would have to be made to pay for a war in full.

War’s consequences: inflation and recession
A major modern war can divert from 40 to 60 percent of a country’s GDP, and one object of war finance is to release within the economy the resources needed for the war effort without causing inflation. If the government merely prints money to pay for the resources it requires, it will bid up prices in competition with civilians. The alternative is to reduce civilian consumption by imposing taxes at levels sufficient to force consumers to forego bidding for goods and services. The income from taxes can then be applied by the government to bid for the resources released by its program.

Taxation acts both to raise necessary finance and simultaneously to reduce aggregate demand, which releases the resources needed for the war effort. The war effort represents a substantial expansion of production, for which producers receive wages and profits. When these same producers attempt to spend their incomes, they face a diminished quantity of civilian goods available for purchase. They must either face rapidly rising prices (caused by excess money chasing insufficient goods), or they must restrain—or be restrained—from spending. A war economy therefore imposes higher taxes on wages and profits to reduce demand. War bonds and taxes provide finance for the war effort and reduce demand for civilian goods and services. To conduct a major war without such an austerity program risks inflation.

If inflation is a risk during a war, recession is another risk at the end of it. The massive expansion in production to provide resources for the war effort, if suddenly contracted by the cancellation of all defense contracts, throws large numbers of people out of work. The unemployed reduce their consumer spending, causing further cuts in aggregate demand, which throws yet more people out of work.

World War I was followed by recession. Because much of the war damage along the Western Front was confined to the vast, static battlefields across France, where the destruction was mainly human and the cost was mainly in war materials, there was no need for a massive reconstruction program. Also, the damage on the Eastern Front was swept behind the newly formed Soviet state, which for ideological reasons eschewed capitalist reconstruction. After the war factories closed down, removing a flow of wages and profits into the economy, the demobilization of troops put surplus labour into an economy that was already in recession.

Recession was averted at the end of World War II by reconstruction of the cities and economies of western Europe and Japan. Reconstruction rapidly transformed the war economies into mass consumer economies supported by the pent-up demand that had been frustrated by the lack of civilian goods and by high taxes during the war. In Europe’s case there was a transfer of capital from the United States through the Marshall Plan. As the war economies were dismantled, economic growth surged, and those countries that did best economically were those that dismantled their highly regulated, government-controlled war economies quickest (West Germany, for example). Those countries that were least successful in dismantling their regulated economies were the slowest to recover. Among these were Britain, which increased state intervention from 1946 to 1951, and the Soviet-controlled economies of eastern Europe, which went even further down the road of government-managed economies.

source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/155696/defense-economics
15.14 Diposting oleh sourceSite 0

Economic Development

by: Anne O. Krueger, Hla Myint

Economic Development, the process whereby simple, low-income national economies are transformed into modern industrial economies. Although the term is sometimes used as a synonym for economic growth, generally it is employed to describe a change in a country’s economy involving qualitative as well as quantitative improvements. The theory of economic development—how primitive and poor economies can evolve into sophisticated and relatively prosperous ones—is of critical importance to underdeveloped countries, and it is usually in this context that the issues of economic development are discussed.

Economic development first became a major concern after World War II. As the era of European colonialism ended, many former colonies and other countries with low living standards came to be termed underdeveloped countries, to contrast their economies with those of the developed countries, which were understood to be Canada, the United States, those of western Europe, most eastern European countries, the then Soviet Union, Japan, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. As living standards in most poor countries began to rise in subsequent decades, they were renamed the developing countries.

There is no universally accepted definition of what a developing country is; neither is there one of what constitutes the process of economic development. Developing countries are usually categorized by a per capita income criterion, and economic development is usually thought to occur as per capita incomes rise. A country’s per capita income (which is almost synonymous with per capita output) is the best available measure of the value of the goods and services available, per person, to the society per year. Although there are a number of problems of measurement of both the level of per capita income and its rate of growth, these two indicators are the best available to provide estimates of the level of economic well-being within a country and of its economic growth.

It is well to consider some of the statistical and conceptual difficulties of using the conventional criterion of underdevelopment before analyzing the causes of underdevelopment. The statistical difficulties are well known. To begin with, there are the awkward borderline cases. Even if analysis is confined to the underdeveloped and developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there are rich oil countries that have per capita incomes well above the rest but that are otherwise underdeveloped in their general economic characteristics. Second, there are a number of technical difficulties that make the per capita incomes of many underdeveloped countries (expressed in terms of an international currency, such as the U.S. dollar) a very crude measure of their per capita real income. These difficulties include the defectiveness of the basic national income and population statistics, the inappropriateness of the official exchange rates at which the national incomes in terms of the respective domestic currencies are converted into the common denominator of the U.S. dollar, and the problems of estimating the value of the noncash components of real incomes in the underdeveloped countries. Finally, there are conceptual problems in interpreting the meaning of the international differences in the per capita income levels.

Although the difficulties with income measures are well established, measures of per capita income correlate reasonably well with other measures of economic well-being, such as life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and literacy rates. Other indicators, such as nutritional status and the per capita availability of hospital beds, physicians, and teachers, are also closely related to per capita income levels. While a difference of, say, 10 percent in per capita incomes between two countries would not be regarded as necessarily indicative of a difference in living standards between them, actual observed differences are of a much larger magnitude. India’sper capita income, for example, was estimated at $270 in 1985. In contrast, Brazil’s was estimated to be $1,640, and Italy’s was $6,520. While economists have cited a number of reasons why the implication that Italy’s living standard was 24 times greater than India’s might be biased upward, no one would doubt that the Italian living standard was significantly higher than that of Brazil, which in turn was higher than India’s by a wide margin.

The interpretation of a low per capita income level as an index of poverty in a material sense may be accepted with two qualifications. First, the level of material living depends not on per capita income as such but on per capita consumption. The two may differ considerably when a large proportion of the national income is diverted from consumption to other purposes; for example, through a policy of forced saving. Second, the poverty of a country is more faithfully reflected by the representative standard of living of the great mass of its people. This may be well below the simple arithmetic average of per capita income or consumption when national income is very unequally distributed and there is a wide gap in the standard of living between the rich and the poor.

The usual definition of a developing country is that adopted by the World Bank: “low-income developing countries” in 1985 were defined as those with per capita incomes below $400; “middle-income developing countries” were defined as those with per capita incomes between $400 and $4,000. To be sure, countries with the same per capita income may not otherwise resemble one another: some countries may derive much of their incomes from capital-intensive enterprises, such as the extraction of oil, whereas other countries with similar per capita incomes may have more numerous and more productive uses of their labour force to compensate for the absence of wealth in resources. Kuwait, for example, was estimated to have a per capita income of $14,480 in 1985, but 50 percent of that income originated from oil. In most regards, Kuwait’s economic and social indicators fell well below what other countries with similar per capita incomes had achieved. Centrally planned economies are also generally regarded as a separate class, although China and North Korea are universally considered developing countries. A major difficulty is that prices serve less as indicators of relative scarcity in centrally planned economies and hence are less reliable as indicators of the per capita availability of goods and services than in market-oriented economies.

Estimates of percentage increases in real per capita income are subject to a somewhat smaller margin of error than are estimates of income levels. While year-to-year changes in per capita income are heavily influenced by such factors as weather (which affects agricultural output, a large component of income in most developing countries), a country’s terms of trade, and other factors, growth rates of per capita income over periods of a decade or more are strongly indicative of the rate at which average economic well-being has increased in a country.
Economic development as an objective of policy
Motives for development

The field of development economics is concerned with the causes of underdevelopment and with policies that may accelerate the rate of growth of per capita income. While these two concerns are related to each other, it is possible to devise policies that are likely to accelerate growth (through, for example, an analysis of the experiences of other developing countries) without fully understanding the causes of underdevelopment.

Studies of both the causes of underdevelopment and of policies and actions that may accelerate development are undertaken for a variety of reasons. There are those who are concerned with the developing countries on humanitarian grounds; that is, with the problem of helping the people of these countries to attain certain minimum material standards of living in terms of such factors as food, clothing, shelter, and nutrition. For them, low per capita income is the measure of the problem of poverty in a material sense. The aim of economic development is to improve the material standards of living by raising the absolute level of per capita incomes. Raising per capita incomes is also a stated objective of policy of the governments of all developing countries. For policymakers and economists attempting to achieve their governments’ objectives, therefore, an understanding of economic development, especially in its policy dimensions, is important. Finally, there are those who are concerned with economic development either because they believe it is what people in developing countries want or because they believe that political stability can be assured only with satisfactory rates of economic growth. These motives are not mutually exclusive. Since World War II many industrial countries have extended foreign aid to developing countries for a combination of humanitarian and political reasons.

Those who are concerned with political stability tend to see the low per capita incomes of the developing countries in relative terms; that is, in relation to the high per capita incomes of the developed countries. For them, even if a developing country is able to improve its material standards of living through a rise in the level of its per capita income, it may still be faced with the more intractable subjective problem of the discontent created by the widening gap in the relative levels between itself and the richer countries. (This effect arises simply from the operation of the arithmetic of growth on the large initial gap between the income levels of the developed and the underdeveloped countries. As an example, an underdeveloped country with a per capita income of $100 and a developed country with a per capita income of $1,000 may be considered. The initial gap in their incomes is $900. Let the incomes in both countries grow at 5 percent. After one year, the income of the underdeveloped country is $105, and the income of the developed country is $1,050. The gap has widened to $945. The income of the underdeveloped country would have to grow by 50 percent to maintain the same absolute gap of $900.) Although there was once in development economics a debate as to whether raising living standards or reducing the relative gap in living standards was the true desideratum of policy, experience during the 1960–80 period convinced most observers that developing countries could, with appropriate policies, achieve sufficiently high rates of growth both to raise their living standards fairly rapidly and to begin closing the gap.Hla MyintAnne O. Krueger
The impact of discontent

Although concern over the question of a subjective sense of discontent among the underdeveloped and developing countries has waxed and waned, it has never wholly disappeared. The underdeveloped countries’ sense of dissatisfaction and grievance arises not only from measurable differences in national incomes but also from the less easily measurable factors, such as their reaction against the colonial past and their complex drives to raise their national prestige and achieve equality in the broadest sense with the developed countries. Thus, it is not uncommon to find their governments using a considerable proportion of their resources in prestige projects, ranging from steel mills, hydroelectric dams, universities, and defense expenditure to international athletics. These symbols of modernization may contribute a nationally shared satisfaction and pride but may or may not contribute to an increase in the measurable national income. Second, it is possible to argue that in many cases the internal gap in incomes within individual underdeveloped countries may be a more potent source of the subjective level of discontent than the international gap in income. Faster economic growth may help to reduce the internal economic disparities in a less painful way, but it must be remembered that faster economic growth also tends to introduce greater disruption and the need for making bigger readjustments in previous ways of life and may thus increase the subjective sense of frustration and discontent. Finally, it is difficult to establish that the subjective problem of discontent will bear a simple and direct relationship to the size of the international gap in incomes. Some of the apparently most discontented countries are to be found in Latin America, where the per capita incomes are generally higher than in Asia and Africa. A skeptic can turn the whole approach to a reductio ad absurdum by pointing out that even the developed countries with their high and rising levels of per capita income have not been able to solve the subjective problem of discontent and frustration among various sections of their population.

Two conclusions may be drawn from the above points. First, the subjective problem of discontent in the underdeveloped countries is a genuine and important problem in international relations. But economic policy acting on measurable economic magnitudes can play only a small part in the solution of what essentially is a problem in international politics. Second, for the narrower purpose of economic policy there is no choice but to fall back on the interpretation of the low per capita incomes of the underdeveloped countries as an index of their poverty in a material sense. This can be defended by explicitly adopting the humanitarian value judgment that the underdeveloped countries ought to give priority to improving the material standards of living of the mass of their people. But, even if this value judgment is not accepted, the conventional measure of economic development in terms of a rise in per capita income still retains its usefulness. The governments of the underdeveloped countries may wish to pursue other, nonmaterial goals, but they could make clearer decisions if they knew the economic cost of their decisions. The most significant measure of this economic cost can be expressed in terms of the foregone opportunity to raise the level of per capita income.Hla Myint
A survey of development theories
The hypothesis of underdevelopment

If the underdeveloped countries are merely low-income countries, why call them underdeveloped? The use of the term underdeveloped in fact rests on a general hypothesis on which the whole subject matter of development economics is based. According to this hypothesis, the existing differences in the per capita income levels between the developed and the underdeveloped countries cannot be accounted for purely in terms of differences in natural conditions beyond the control of man and society. That is to say, the underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped because, in some way or another, they have not yet succeeded in making full use of their potential for economic growth. This potential may arise from the underdevelopment of their natural resources, or their human resources, or from the “technological gap.” More generally, it may arise from the underdevelopment of economic organization and institutions, including the network of the market system and the administrative machinery of the government. The general presumption is that the development of this organizational framework would enable an underdeveloped country to make a fuller use not only of its domestic resources but also of its external economic opportunities, in the form of international trade, foreign investment, and technological and organizational innovations.
Development thought after World War II

After World War II a number of developing countries attained independence from their former colonial rulers. One of the common claims made by leaders of independence movements was that colonialism had been responsible for perpetuating low living standards in the colonies. Thus economic development after independence became an objective of policy not only because of the humanitarian desire to raise living standards but also because political promises had been made, and failure to make progress toward development would, it was feared, be interpreted as a failure of the independence movement. Developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere that had not been, or recently been, colonies took up the analogous belief that economic domination by the industrial countries had thwarted their development, and they, too, joined the quest for rapid growth.

At that early period, theorizing about development, and about policies to attain development, accepted the assumption that the policies of the industrial countries were to blame for the poverty of the developing countries. Memories of the Great Depression, when developing countries’ terms of trade had deteriorated markedly, producing sharp reductions in per capita incomes, haunted many policymakers. Finally, even in the developed countries, the Keynesian legacy attached great importance to investment.

In this milieu, it was thought that a “shortage of capital” was the cause of underdevelopment. It followed that policy should aim at an accelerated rate of investment. Since most countries with low per capita incomes were also heavily agricultural (and imported most of the manufactured goods consumed domestically), it was thought that accelerated investment in industrialization and the development of manufacturing industries to supplant imports through “import substitution” was the path to development. Moreover, there was a fundamental distrust of markets, and a major role was therefore assigned to government in allocating investments. Distrust of markets extended especially to the international economy.

Experience with development changed perceptions of the process and of the policies affecting it in important ways. Nonetheless, there are significant elements of truth in some of the earlier ideas, and it is important to understand the thinking underlying them.Hla MyintAnne O. Krueger
Growth economics and development economics

Development economics may be contrasted with another branch of study, called growth economics, which is concerned with the study of the long-run, or steady-state, equilibrium growth paths of the economically developed countries, which have long overcome the problem of initiating development.

Growth theory assumes the existence of a fully developed modern capitalist economy with a sufficient supply of entrepreneurs responding to a well-articulated system of economic incentives to drive the growth mechanism. Typically, it concentrates on macroeconomic relations, particularly the ratio of savings to total output and the aggregate capital–output ratio (that is, the number of units of additional capital required to produce an additional unit of output). Mathematically, this can be expressed (the Harrod–Domar growth equation) as follows: the growth in total output (g) will be equal to the savings ratio (s) divided by the capital–output ratio (k); i.e., g = s/k. Thus, suppose that 12 percent of total output is saved annually and that three units of capital are required to produce an additional unit of output: then the rate of growth in output is 12/3% = 4% per annum. This result is obtained from the basic assumption that whatever is saved will be automatically invested and converted into an increase in output on the basis of a given capital–output ratio. Since a given proportion of this increase in output will be saved and invested on the same basis, a continuous process of growth is maintained.

Growth theory, particularly the Harrod–Domar growth equation, has been frequently applied or misapplied to the economic planning of a developing country. The planner starts from a desired target rate of growth of perhaps 4 percent. Assuming a fixed overall capital–output ratio of, say, 3, it is then asserted that the developing country will be able to achieve this target rate of growth if it can increase its savings to 3 × 4 percent = 12 percent of its total output. The weakness of this type of exercise arises from the assumption of a fixed overall capital–output ratio, which assumes away all the vital problems affecting the developing country’s capacity to absorb capital and invest its saving in a productive manner. These problems include the central problem of the efficient allocation of available savings among alternative investment opportunities and the associated organizational and institutional problems of encouraging the growth of a sufficient supply of entrepreneurs; the provision of appropriate economic incentives through a market system that correctly reflects the relative scarcities of products and factors of production; and the building up of an organizational framework that can effectively implement investment decisions in both the private and the public sectors. Such problems, which generally affect the developing country’s absorptive capacity for capital and a number of other inputs, constitute the core of development economics. Development economics is needed precisely because the assumptions of growth economics, based as they are on the existence of a fully developed and well-functioning modern capitalist economy, do not apply.

The developing and underdeveloped countries are a very mixed collection of countries. They differ widely in area, population density, and natural resources. They are also at different stages in the development of market and financial institutions and of an effective administrative framework. These differences are sufficient to warn against wide-sweeping generalizations about the causes of underdevelopment and all-embracing theoretical models of economic development. But when development economics first came into prominence in the 1950s, there were powerful intellectual and political forces propelling the subject toward such general theoretical models of development and underdevelopment. First, many writers who popularized the subject were frankly motivated by a desire to persuade the developed countries to give more economic aid to the underdeveloped countries, on grounds ranging from humanitarian considerations to considerations of cold-war strategy. Second, there was the reaction of the newly independent underdeveloped countries against their past “colonial economic pattern,” which they identified with free trade and primary production for the export market. These countries were eager to accept general theories of economic development that provided a rationalization for their deep-seated desire for rapid industrialization. Third, there was a parallel reaction, at the academic level, against older economic theory, with its emphasis on the efficient allocation of scarce resources and a striving after new and “dynamic” approaches to economic development.

All of these forces combined to produce a crop of theoretical approaches that soon developed into a fairly fixed orthodoxy with its characteristic emphasis on “crash” programs of investment in both material and human capital, on domestic industrialization, and on government economic planning as the standard ingredients of development policy. These new theories have continued to have a considerable influence on the conventional wisdom in development economics, although in retrospect most of them have turned out to be partial theories. A broad survey of these theories, under three main heads, is given below. It is particularly relevant to the debate over whether the underdeveloped countries should seek economic development through domestic industrialization or through international trade. The limitations of these new theories—and how they led to a gradual revival of a more pragmatic approach todevelopment problems, which falls back increasingly on the older economic theory of efficient allocation of resources—are subsequently traced.
The missing-component approach

First, there are the theories that regard the shortage of some strategic input (such as the supply of savings, foreign exchange, or technical skills) as the main cause of underdevelopment. Once this missing component was supplied—say, by external economic aid—it was believed that economic development would follow in a predictable manner based on fixed quantitative relationships between input and output. The overall capital–output ratio, mentioned above, is the most well-known of these fixed technical coefficients. But similar fixed coefficients have been assumed between the foreign-exchange requirements and total output and between the input of skilled manpower and output.Hla Myint
SHORTAGE OF SAVINGS

Given the broad relationship between capital accumulation and economic growth established in growth theory, it was plausible for growth theorists and development economists to argue that the developing countries were held back mainly by a shortage in the supply of capital. These countries were then saving only 5–7 percent of their total product, and it was manifest (and it remains true) that satisfactory growth cannot be supported by so low a level of investment. It was therefore thought that raising the savings ratio to 10–12 percent was the central problem for developing countries. Early development policy therefore focused on raising resources for investment. Steps toward this end were highly successful in most developing countries, and savings ratios rose to the 15–25 percent range. However, growth rates failed even to approximate the savings rates, and theorists were forced to search for other explanations of differences in growth rates.

It has become increasingly clear that there can be much wastage of capital resources in the developing countries for various reasons, such as wrong choice of investment projects, inefficient implementation and management of these projects, and inappropriate pricing and costing of output. These faults are particularly noticeable in public-sector investment projects and are one of the reasons why the Pearson Commission Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1969) found that “the correlation between the amounts of aid received in the past decades and the growth performance is very weak.” But even in the private sector there may be a considerable distortion in the direction of investment induced by policies designed to encourage development. Thus, in most underdeveloped countries, a considerable part of private expansion investment, both foreign and domestic, has been diverted into the expansion of the manufacturing sector, catering to the domestic market through various inducements, including tariff protection, tax holidays, cheap loans, and generous foreign-exchange allocations granting the opportunity to import capital goods cheaply at overvalued exchange rates. As a consequence, there developed a very considerable amount of excess capacity in the manufacturing sector of the underdeveloped countries pursuing such policies.
FOREIGN-EXCHANGE SHORTAGE

In the 1950s most developing countries were primary commodity exporters, relying on crops and minerals for the bulk of their foreign-exchange earnings through exports, and importing a large number of manufactured goods. The experience of colonialism, and the distrust of the international economy that it engendered, led policymakers in most developing countries to adopt a policy of import substitution. This policy was intended to promote industrialization by protecting domestic producers from the competition of imports. Protection, in the form of high tariffs or the restriction of imports through quotas, was applied indiscriminately, often to inherently high-cost industries that had no hope of ever becoming internationally competitive. Also, after the early stages of import substitution, protected new industries tended to be very intensive in the use of capital and especially of imported capital goods.

The import-substitution approach defined “industrialization” rather narrowly as the expansion of the modern manufacturing sector based on capital-intensive technology. Capital was therefore identified with durable capital equipment in the form of complex machinery and other inputs that the underdeveloped countries were not able to produce domestically. Thus, foreign-exchange requirements were calculated on the basis of the fixed technical input-output coefficients of the manufacturing sector.

With high levels of protection for domestic industry, and with exchange rates that were often maintained at unrealistic levels (usually in an effort to make imported capital goods “cheap”), the experience of most developing countries was that export earnings grew relatively slowly. The simultaneously sharp increase in demand for imported capital goods (and for raw materials and replacement parts as well) resulted in unexpectedly large increases in imports. Most developing countries found themselves with critical foreign-exchange shortages and were forced to reduce imports in order to cut their current-account deficits to manageable proportions.

The cutbacks in imports usually resulted in reduced growth rates, if not recessions. This result led to the view that economic stagnation was caused primarily by a shortage of foreign exchange with which to buy essential industrial inputs. But over the longer term the growth rates of countries that continued to protect their domestic industries heavily not only stagnated but declined sharply. Contrasting the experience of countries that persisted in policies of import substitution with those that followed alternative policies (see below) subsequently demonstrated that foreign-exchange shortage was a barrier to growth only within the context of the protectionist policies adopted and was not inherently a barrier to the development process itself.Hla MyintAnne O. Krueger
EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT

As it became apparent that the physical accumulation of capital was not by itself the key to development, many analysts turned to a lack of education and skills among the population as being a crucial factor in underdevelopment. If education and skill are defined as everything that is required to raise the productivity of the people in the developing countries by improving their skills, enterprise, initiative, adaptability, and attitudes, this proposition is true but is an empty tautology. However, the need for skills and training was first formulated in terms of specific skills and educational qualifications that could be supplied by crash programs in formal education. The usual method of manpower planning thus started from a target rate of expansion in output and tried to estimate the numbers of various types of skilled personnel that would be required to sustain this target rate of economic growth on the basis of an assumed fixed relationship between inputs of skill and national output.

This approach was plausible enough in many developing countries immediately after their political independence, when there were obvious gaps in various branches of the administrative and technical services. But most countries passed through this phase rather quickly. In the meantime, as the result of programs in education expansion, their schools and colleges began producing large numbers of fresh graduates at much faster rates than their general rate of economic growth could supply suitable new jobs for. This created a growing problem of educated unemployment. An important factor behind the rapid educational expansion was the expectation that after graduation students would be able to obtain well-paying white-collar jobs at salary levels many times the prevailing per capita income of their countries. Thus, the underdeveloped countries’ inability to create jobs to absorb their growing armies of graduates created an explosive element in what came to be called the revolution of expectations.

It is possible to see a close parallelism between the narrow concept of industrialization as the expansion of the manufacturing sector and the narrow concept of education as the academic and technical qualifications that can be supplied by the expansion of the formal educational system. If a broader concept of education, relevant for economic development, is needed, it is necessary to seek it in the pervasive educational influence of the economic environment as a whole on the learning process of the people of the underdeveloped countries. This is a complex process that depends on, among other less easily analyzable things, the system of economic incentives and signals that can mold the economic behaviour of the people of the underdeveloped countries and affect their ability to make rational economic decisions and their willingness to introduce or adapt to economic changes. Unfortunately, the economic environment in many underdeveloped countries is dominated by a network of government controls that tend not to be conducive to such ends.
Surplus resources and disguised unemployment

Two theories emphasized the existence of surplus resources in developing countries as the central challenge for economic policy. The first concentrated on the countries with relatively abundant natural resources and low population densities and argued that a considerable amount of both surplus land and surplus labour might still exist in these countries because of inadequate marketing facilities and lack of transport and communications. Economic development was pictured as a process whereby these underutilized resources of the subsistence sector would be drawn into cash production for the export market. International trade was regarded as the chief market outlet, or vent, for the surplus resources. The second theory was concerned with the thickly populated countries and the possibility of using their surplus labour as the chief means of promoting economic development. According to this theory, because of heavy population pressure on land, the marginal product of labour (that is, the extra output derived from the employment of an extra unit of labour) was reduced to zero or to a very low level. But the people in the subsistence sector were able to enjoy a certain customary minimum level of real income because the extended-family system of the rural society shared the total output of the family farm among its members. A considerable proportion of labour in the traditional agricultural sector was thus thought to contribute little or nothing to total output and to really be in a state of disguised unemployment. By this theory, the labour might be drawn into other uses without any cost to society.

It is necessary to clear up a number of preliminary points about the concept of disguised unemployment before considering its applications. First, it is highly questionable whether the marginal product of labour is actually zero even in densely populated countries such as India or Pakistan. Even in these countries, with existing agricultural methods, all available labour is needed in the peak seasons, such as harvest. The most important part of disguised unemployment is thus what may be better described as seasonal unemployment during the off-seasons. The magnitude of this seasonal unemployment, however, depends not so much on the population density on land as on the number of crops cultivated on the same piece of land through the year. There is thus little seasonal unemployment in countries such as Taiwan or South Korea, which have much higher population densities than India, because improved irrigation facilities enable them to grow a succession of crops on the same land throughout the year. But there may be considerable seasonal unemployment even in sparsely populated countries growing only one crop a year.

The main weakness in the proposal to use disguised unemployment for the construction of major social-overhead-capital projects arises from an inadequate consideration of the problem of providing the necessary subsistence fund to maintain the workers during what may be a considerably long waiting period before these projects yield consumable output. This may be managed somehow for small-scale local-community projects when the workers are maintained in situ by their relatives. But when it is proposed to move a large number of surplus workers away from their home villages for major construction projects taking a considerable time to complete, the problem of raising a sufficient subsistence fund to maintain the labour becomes formidable. The only practicable way of raising such a subsistence fund is to encourage voluntary saving and the expansion of a marketable surplus of food that can be purchased with the savings to maintain the workers. The mere existence of disguised unemployment does not in any way ease this problem.Hla Myint
Role of governments and markets

In earlier thinking about development, it was assumed that the market mechanisms of developed economies were so unreliable in developing economies that governments had to assume central responsibility for economic activity. This was to be done through economic planning for the entire economy (see economic planning: Planning in developing countries), which in turn would be implemented by active government participation in the economy and pervasive controls over all private-sector economic activity. Government participation took many forms: Public-sector enterprises were established to manufacture many commodities, including steel, machine tools, fertilizers, heavy chemicals, and even textiles and clothing; government marketing boards assumed monopoly power over the purchase and sale of many agricultural commodities; and government agencies became the sole importers of a variety of goods, and they often became exporters as well. Controls over private-sector activity were even more extensive: Price controls were established for many commodities; import licensing procedures eliminated the importing of commodities not given priority in official plans; investment licenses were required before factories could be expanded; capacity licenses regulated maximum permissible outputs; and comprehensive regulations governed the conditions of employment of workers.

The consequence, frequently, was that indigenous entrepreneurs often found it more financially rewarding to devote their energies and ingenuity to the task of procuring the necessary government import licenses and other permits and exploiting the loopholes in government regulations than to the problem of raising the efficiency and productivity of resources. For public-sector enterprises, political pressures often resulted in the employment of many more persons than could be productively used and in other practices conducive to extremely high-cost and inefficient operations. The consequent fiscal burden diverted resources that might otherwise have been used for investment, while the inefficient use of resources dampened growth rates.

Related to the belief in market failure and in the necessity for government intervention was the view that the efficiency of the price mechanism in developing countries was very small. This was reflected in the view of foreign-exchange shortage, already discussed, in which it was thought that there are fixed relationships between imported capital and domestic expansion. It was also reflected in the view that farmers are relatively insensitive to relative prices and in the belief that there are few entrepreneurs in developing countries.
Lessons from development experience

By the end of the 1950s the experience gained from efforts to promote economic development showed great differences among developing countries. Some had broken away relatively quickly from the import-substitution, government-control and -ownership pattern that had been the early development wisdom. Others persisted with the same policies for several decades. A great deal was learned from the experiences of different developing countries.
The importance of agriculture

Despite early emphasis on industrialization through import substitution, a first major lesson of postwar experience was that there is a close connection between the rate of growth in the output of the agricultural sector and the general rate of economic development. The high rates of economic growth are associated with rapid expansion of agricultural output and low rates of economic growth with the slow growth of agriculture. This is (in hindsight, at least) to be expected, since agriculture forms a large part of the total domestic product and of the exports of the developing countries. What is more interesting is that the expansion of agricultural output was by no means confined to those countries with an abundant supply of unused land to be brought under cultivation. Taiwan and South Korea, with some of the highest population densities in the world, were able to expand their agricultural output rapidly by a vigorous pursuit of appropriate policies. These included the provision of adequate irrigation facilities, enabling a succession of crops to be grown on the same piece of land throughout the year; the use of high-yielding seeds and fertilizers, which raised the yields per acre in a dramatic fashion; provision of adequate incentives for producers by setting producer prices at reasonable levels; and improvements in credit and marketing facilities and a general improvement in the economic organization of the agricultural sector. Agricultural development is important because it raises the incomes of the mass of the people in the countryside; in addition, it increases the size of the domestic market for the manufacturing sector and reduces internal economic disparities between the urban centres and the rural districts.
The role of exports

A second conclusion to be drawn from experience is the close connection between export expansion and economic development. The high-growth countries were characterized by rapid expansion in exports. Here again it is important to note that export expansion was not confined to those countries fortunate in their natural resources, such as the oil-exporting countries. Some of the developing countries were able to expand their exports in spite of limitations in natural resources by initiating economic policies that shifted resources from inefficient domestic manufacturing industries to export production. Nor was export expansion from the developing countries confined to primary products. There was very rapid expansion of exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods. This phenomenon occurred not only in the extremely rapidly growing, newly industrialized countries (NICs)—Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as Hong Kong—but also from other developing countries including Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey. Countries that adopted export-oriented development strategies (of which the most notable were the NICs) experienced extremely high rates of growth that were regarded as unattainable in the 1950s and ’60s. They were also able to maintain their growth momentum during periods of worldwide recession better than were the countries that maintained their import substitution policies.

Analysts have pointed to a number of reasons why the export-oriented growth strategy seems to deliver more rapid economic development than the import substitution strategy. First, a developing country able to specialize in producing labour-intensive commodities uses its comparative advantage in the international market and is also better able to use its most abundant resource—unskilled labour. The experience of export-oriented countries has been that there is little or no disguised unemployment once labour-market regulations are dismantled and incentives are created for individual firms to sell in the export market. Second, most developing countries have such small domestic markets that efforts to grow by starting industries that rely on domestic demand result in uneconomically small, inefficient enterprises. Moreover, those enterprises will typically be protected from international competition and the incentives it provides for efficient production techniques. Third, an export-oriented strategy is inconsistent with the impulse to impose detailed economic controls; the absence of such controls, and their replacement by incentives, provides a great stimulus to increases in output and to the efficiency with which resources are employed. The increasing capacity of a developing country’s entrepreneurs to adapt their resources and internal economic organization to the pressures of world-market demand and international competition is a very important connecting link between export expansion and economic development. It is important in this connection to stress the educative effect of freer international trade in creating an environment conducive to the acceptance of new ideas, new wants, and new techniques of production and methods of organization from abroad.
The negative effect of controls

Another major lesson that was learned is that poor people are, if anything, more responsive to incentives than rich people. Nominal exchange rates that are pegged without regard to domestic inflation have strong negative effects on incentives to export; producer prices for agricultural goods that are set as a small fraction of their world market price constitute a significant disincentive to agricultural production; and controls on prices and investment serve as significant deterrents to economic activity. Indeed, in most environments, controls lead to “rent-seeking” behaviour, in which resources are diverted from productive activity and instead are used to try to win import licenses, or to get the necessary bureaucratic permissions. In addition, in many countries, “parallel,” or black, markets emerged, which diverted resources from activities in the official sector. In some countries, legal exports diminished sharply as smuggling and underinvoicing intensified in response to increasing discrepancies between the official exchange rate and the black-market rate.
The importance of appropriate incentives

As a corollary to the lesson that controls may strongly divert economic activity from an efficient allocation of resources, it became increasingly evident that inappropriate incentives can adversely affect economic behaviour. The response of agricultural supply to increases in producer prices is considerably stronger than was earlier believed. Likewise, individuals respond to incentives with respect to their education and training. Thus, much of the overinvestment in education referred to earlier came to be seen as the result of artificially inflated wages for university graduates in the public sector and of the fact that university education was virtually free to students in many developing countries. As a consequence, students perceived an incentive to obtain university degrees, even when there was a chance that they would remain unemployed for an extended period of time. When they did eventually find employment, the high wage would compensate for their earlier period of unemployment. Privately, such behaviour makes good sense in response to existing incentives; socially, however, it represents a waste of valuable and scarce resources.
The role of the international economy

In the modern view of development, an open, expanding international economy is the greatest support that the developed countries can provide for developing countries. Foreign aid can be extremely helpful in situations in which policies are conducive to development, but development will in any event be accelerated if the international economy is experiencing healthy growth. Removal of the trade barriers that developed countries have erected against developing countries is at least as important as economic aid. Trade barriers are many. They include restrictions on temperate-zone agricultural products and sugar; restrictions on the simpler labour-intensive manufactured goods (which often can be produced more cheaply in developing countries) including especially the Multifibre Arrangement under which imports of textiles and clothing into developed countries are greatly restricted; and tariff escalation, or higher rates of duties on processed products as compared with raw materials, which discourages the growth of processing industries in the developing countries. The removal of these trade barriers can help those developing countries that have already shown their capacity to take advantage of the available external economic opportunities to grow even more satisfactorily and can also provide additional incentives for other developing countries to alter their economic policies.
Population growth

Still another lesson is the desirability of slowing down the rapid population growth that characterizes most developing countries. Their average rate of population growth is about 2.2 percent per year, but there are some countries where population growth is 3 percent or more. If the aim of economic development is to raise the level of per capita incomes, it is obvious that this can be achieved both by increasing the rate of growth of total output and by reducing the rate of growth of population. Development economists of the 1950s tended to neglect population-control policies. They were partly seduced by theories of dramatically raising total output through crash investment programs and partly by the belief that population growth could be controlled only slowly, through gradual changes in social attitudes and values. But it is now recognized that some births in developing countries are unwanted. Great technical advances in methods of birth control about the same time made possible mass dissemination at very low cost. Countries where these methods were made available experienced significant declines in birth rates, although significant changes in social attitudes and values are necessary before average family size declines enough to halt population growth. As soon as birth rates stop rising, the relative increase in population in the working-age groups and the higher income available to existing family members immediately start to release resources for increasing consumption and saving.
Development of domestic industry

The positive case for the expansion of the manufacturing sector may now be considered. It is based on the general assumption that the manufacturing sector will in due course become the leading sector, drawing in workers (in part, siphoning off a portion of the increase in the labour force that would otherwise tend to drive down labour productivity in agriculture) from the traditional agricultural sector and providing them with higher-productivity jobs than could be obtained in agriculture. Agricultural productivity would necessarily be rising simultaneously, as investments in that sector permitted increasing output. Whereas it was earlier thought that this process would follow the historical experience of countries such as England and Japan, the lesson from the successful developing countries is that by providing incentives and infrastructural support to encourage exports, there are significant opportunities for expansion of manufacturing of labour-intensive commodities, opportunities that can promote rapid growth.

Thus, given the much greater size of the international economy, and the much lower transport and communications costs that confront contemporary developing countries as contrasted with conditions in the 19th century, the potential for rapid growth is much greater now. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have experienced in a decade proportionate increases in per capita incomes that it took England and Japan a century to achieve. Whether other developing countries can follow this lead depends on a number of factors, including their economic policies and the continued growth of the international economy.Hla MyintAnne O. Krueger

The central problem of countries with low per capita output is that they have not as yet succeeded in making use of their potential economic opportunities. To do so, they must achieve an efficient allocation of the availableresources and provide incentives for resource accumulation. But efficient allocation of resources is not merely a matter of the formal optimum conditions of economic theory. It requires the building up of an effective institutional and organizational framework to carry out the allocation of resources. In the private sector this requires the development of a well-articulated market system that embraces the markets for final products and the markets for factors of production. In the public sector the development of the organizational framework requires improvements in the administrative machinery of the government, especially in its fiscal machinery.

In the setting of the developing countries, one is concerned not only with the once for all problem of efficient allocation of resources but also with improving the capacity of these countries to make a more effective use of their resources over a period of time. That is to say, one is concerned not only with the static problem of the efficient allocation of given resources with the given organizational framework but also with dynamic problems of improving the capability of this framework. From this point of view, there is no conflict, as some have maintained, between the static, or the short-run, considerations and the dynamic, or long-run, considerations. The two sets of requirements move in the same direction.

The problem of the efficient allocation of investable funds in the developing countries may be taken as an example. Static rules would require the developing countries to have higher rates of interest to reflect their greater capital scarcity. But many developing countries, under the influence of dynamic theories of economic development, have used a variety of direct and indirect controls to divert large sums of capital to the manufacturing sector in the form of loans at interest rates well below the level required to equate the demand and supply of capital funds. This practice has resulted not only in a wasteful use of scarce capital resources but also in a retardation of the development of a domestic capital market. Instead of developing a unified capital market for the whole country, it aggravates the financial dualism characterized by low rates of interest in the modern sector and high rates in the traditional sector. The policy of keeping the official rate of interest below the equilibrium rate of interest also results in an excess demand for loans, leading to domestic inflation and pressure on the balance of payments and to a discouragement of the growth of domestic savings. Few private individuals are prepared to buy government securities when they frequently carry rates of interest below the rate of depreciation in the value of money. Through the pursuit of “cheap money” policies that contradict the real facts of capital scarcity, the governments of developing countries have failed to make use of the opportunity of building up a domestic capital market based on an expanding volume of transactions in government securities.Hla Myint
Developing countries and debt

After World War II it was thought that developing countries would require foreign aid in their early stages of development. This aid would supplement the capital created by domestic savings, permitting a higher rate of investment and thus stimulating growth. It was expected that their reliance on official sources of additional capital would continue until their economies had progressed enough to gain them access to private international capital markets.

Until the 1980s this pattern seemed to evolve as predicted. In the 1950s almost all capital flows to developing countries were from official sources, in the form of foreign aid from developed countries or of resources from the multilateral institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the 1960s some of the export-oriented, rapidly growing countries began to rely on private international capital markets. Some, such as Singapore, attracted direct private foreign investment; others, such as South Korea, relied more on borrowing from commercial banks. In the 1970s many oil-importing developing countries were able to turn to borrowing from private sources when their economies were hit by the severe oil price increase of 1973.

The borrowing by rapidly growing countries was of the type earlier envisaged. Investment yielded a very high rate of return in these countries, so additional foreign resources could be attracted and productively used. However, some other countries borrowed in order to offset higher oil prices and in order to maintain an excess of expenditures over consumption, without developing the highly profitable investments with which to finance the debt-servicing obligations they incurred. Balance-of-payments crises and debt-servicing difficulties had been experienced by a few countries in most years since the 1950s, but with the second oil price increase and the worldwide recession of the early 1980s, developing countries increased their borrowing and total indebtedness sharply until commercial banks virtually ceased voluntary lending after Mexico experienced difficulty meeting its obligations in 1982. The result was that a large number of developing countries were unable to meet their debt obligations, as export earnings declined owing to the recession, interest rates were rising, and new money was not forthcoming.

For many heavily indebted developing countries, the consequence was a prolonged period of slow growth or even declines in outputs and incomes. The lessons were several: The buoyant conditions of the 1970s were not likely to recur, and policies that had sustained satisfactory growth rates in those conditions were not likely to do so in the future; countries that had not yet moved away from import-substitution policies and direct governmental controls would need to undertake structural adjustments rather rapidly in order to resume their growth and to restore creditworthiness; and future private lending to developing countries would need to be somewhat more discriminating as to the economic prospects of recipient countries.


Development in a broader perspective

Modern economic development started in Great Britain, which in the 1780s accounted for a little over 1 percent of the total world population at that time. Since then, economic development has spread in widening circles to other parts of the world, spurred on by a series of technological innovations, particularly in the form of improvements in transport and communications. In the early decades of the 19th century the circle of the developed countries was limited to western Europe. By the late 19th century the circle had widened to include North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan. By the early 1970s about 34 percent of the total world population belonged to the developed countries, which among them had 87.5 percent of the total world GNP. What are the prospects of the still-to-develop countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa joining this circle of economic development?

On the negative side there are a number of factors that add to their difficulties. First, the level of per capita product in the present-day developing countries is much lower than in the developed countries in their preindustrialization phase (with the exception of Japan). Second, the present-day developing countries have large population bases and are handicapped by much faster rates of population growth. Third, they have generally a much weaker social and political framework to cope with the more explosive forces of discontent engendered by their reaction against their colonial past and by their internal economic disparities.

On the positive side, the present-day developing countries can draw upon a greater store of scientific and technical knowledge from the developed countries. The potential opportunities to exploit the “technological gap” are not confined to manufacturing. Modern science and technology can make immense contributions to agriculture, as illustrated by the Green Revolution created by the introduction of improved seeds and fertilizers in some Asian and Latin-American countries. Modern methods of birth control can make a decisive contribution in the race for raising per capita incomes. In addition, as the circle of the developed countries widens, they are bound to exert an increasing upward pull on the developing countries.

The economic growth of the developed countries has generally resulted in an expanding demand for the products and sometimes for direct labour services from the developing countries. But there are also the stronger localized pulls, such as the pull of the United States economy on Mexico and the pull of western Europe on the developing countries of southern Europe. The spectacular economic growth of Japan since World War II may also exert a similar pull on neighbouring countries in East Asia.

Countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are rapidly approaching developed-country status, and the circle is widening still farther. Rapid growth rates are being experienced by many countries in Southeast Asia. If one considers the successful developing countries of the 1950s and ’60s, it is evident that the rapid growth of the international economy was a very positive contributing factor in their success. Future widening of the circle will no doubt depend in large part on whether the growth of the international economy attains a satisfactory level.

In conclusion, the experience of the postwar years has provided many lessons that form a basis for optimism. A great deal has been learned about the types of economic policies that are conducive to rapid economic development. Rates of growth of per capita income experienced by the developing countries have been significantly higher than had been achieved by the first countries to develop. Attainable rates of growth of per capita income appear to be far above what formerly was thought feasible. The chief potential obstacles to successful development appear to be the spectre of disintegration of the international economy, should protectionistpressures be increasingly effective, and the inability or unwillingness of leaders in developing countries to adopt policies conducive to rapid economic growth.

source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/178361/economic-development
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